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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HICHAHD C. PEEPLES,
)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

· Case No.
10537

I

ELLIOTT 'YOLFE, RICHARD L.

:1IcGlLLlS and "~OLFE'S SPORTS-)
JlA~'S HEADQUARTERS, a Copartnership,

Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATE:\IENT OF KIND OF CASE
This case is an appeal from a permanent injunction
issued against appellants, in an action brought for an
injunction and for an accounting and damages.

DISPOSITION BELU\V
The question of damages having been reserved, the
defendant's appeal from an injunction issued in respondent's farnr.

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-respondent prays for affinnance of tlir
order below.
STATE1\1ENT OF FACTS
Appellants' statement of facts is substantialii
correct except as to the following obserrntions:
The respondent has engaged in a small, well knoll'':
and personalized sporting goods business in Salt Lakt
City for many years. The respondent, having been a
partner in "Al's Sporting Goods" from 1946 (R. 18/,
purchased the entire interest in 1957 ( R. 18), when tht
only other partner died. The respondent continued as
a sole proprietor in the operation of "Al's Sporting
Goods" until, because of business adversity, he was
compelled to execute an assignment for the benefit of
his creditors.
As to respondent's indicated intent, insofar as it
purports to express that the trade name and good will
were expressly transferred under the assignment for
the benefit of creditors, (Ex. 1; See Appellants' Briel
at 5, 6) the reply on cross examination should be viewed
in the context of the complete record on that point.
Respondent expressly stated that he would not sell the
trade name (Tr. 59).
After the assignment, the assignee advertised for
bids in order to liquidate the inventory and fixtures m
2

·,f ·tion of creditor's claims. The notice sent to prossat1s ac
" .
.
·iective purchasers stated that bids will be accepted for

~]] assets or separate offers on the merchandise and

,. t u1.,,s
" 1\.ppellants, in response to the notice,
nx
sulnnitted the high bid for '' ... the merchandise inven~ory ::ind fixtures of Al's Sporting Goods, signed,
"Eliott \Yolfe' " (Ex. P-20, Tr. 130). Appellants,
heini:,· high bidders, received a bill of sale from the
;;ssiguee. listing only ''furniture, fixtures and merchanilise a~ per inventory list attached . . . " ( R. 11-a).
The assignee retained an automobile used in respondenfc business (Tr. 61), and accounts receivable listed
at $25,300.00 ( R. 11 ; Tr. 53, 54!) , neither of which
were bid on by the appellants.
L· • • . • •

After acquiring the inventory and fixtures, appellant Wolfe, by his own testimony stated "I didn't know
what I was going to do" (Tr. 126). On cross examination appellant further testified:
"Q. You didn't know ... whether you were going to take the merchandise down to 'Volfe's
or what?"

A. ''That's correct" (Tr. 126).
Subsequently, the appellants reopened respondent's
place of business, and held themselves out to the public
as "Al's Sporting Goods" (R. 19, 20). Upon receipt
of notice and complaint from respondent that the above
course of action was unauthorized, appellants acquired
a "quit claim" bill of sale from the assignee which purported to transfer " ... all of the right, title and interest

3

which it (assignee for benefit of creditors) acqu· d
ll'e to
the trade name ... " ( R. 12).
Appellants continued to hold themselves out to tlif
public as "Al's Sporting Goods," both through their
ostensible management of the business and bv• exp re)\
advertising in local newspapers (R. 20, Ex. D. 13.
14, 15 and 16). The advertising itself was in all respecll
identical in form to the advertising used by respondent
At this point in time, respondent brought suit 1
enjoin appellants' use of the trade name. Equitable
relief was granted in respondent's favor, but not until
the end of the Christmas mercantile season on or aboul
December 24, 1965 (R. 21). At about this time appeJ.
lants had advertised "a quiting business sale," inform·
ing the general public that "Al's Sporting Goods'' was
quitting for good.
11

ARGUMENT
POINT I. RESPONDENT HAS THE
RIGHT OF SOLE ENJOYMENT AND USE
OF THE TRADE NAME "AL'S SPORTING
GOODS."

A. The N aturc of Respondent's Ownership.
'Ve are not dealing in property law conceptualizim.
A purported transfer does not and cannot transfer
"ownership." Rather, what is required is a transfer ol
that which will give a right of protection to the t~ans·
feree so that he may reap the rewards of the busmes!
4

"good will," or the "expectation of custom" which a
trade name symbolizes. If such a transfer is effective,
it follows that the transferee may enjoin its use by
others. That he must prove the transfer was effective
is the crux of the problem and not that he must establish
a "chain of title."
The Supreme Court of the United States in BeechSut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 273 U.S. 629,

632, (1927), (Per Holmes, J.) expresses the nature

Jf the right to protection of one who "has" a trade name:

" ... in a qualified sense the mark is property,
protected and alienable, although as with other
property its outline is shown only by the law
of torts, of which the right is a prophetic summary.''
vVhat the owner has is an expectancy (in oversimplified terms), an expectation that there will be a
continued "habit of patronage."
The sole question presently before this Court is
whether the trial court erred in its finding that the
appellants acquired no interest in respondent's trade
name by virtue of their purchase of the inventory and
fixtures of "Al's Sporting Goods."
Respondent respectfully contends that the general
assignment was not intended to be, and never was
effective, to "transfer" the trade name. Further, the
"transfer" would not be legally effectual even if respondent had expressly intended to, and did, transfer
the trade name.

5

That the wrongful use of a trade name ma.,
enjoined and the rightful owner of the trade nam ) ri:
e COfJJ·
pensated when he has suffered damage, cannot be qut1
tioned. This Court has so ruled. Security Title 1n.,
Agency v. Security 1 1itle Ins. Co., 15 Utah 2d 93, 3i.
P.2d 691 (1964); Budget System, Inc. v. Bud,getL1J
and Finance Plan, 12 Gtah 2d 18, 361 P.2d 512 (196J,
11

B. 1'he General Assignmc1lt JVas Not E.ffectite,
Transfer Respondent's Trade Name.
Appellant's contention that the general assignmem
for the benefit of creditors effectively transferred tht
trade name is unwarranted both in reason and authority
The express terms of the assignment are not li1
dispute. A perusal of those terms indicates that what
was transferred were respondent's physical asseh,
those convertible to cash and distributible to respona·
ent's creditors (Ex. 1). Such is the purpose of a genera!
assignment for the benefit of creditors. See UTAH Com
ANNOTATED, 1953, § § 6-1-1, et, seq.
'¥here current assets are named with particularity.
and a savings clause is appended assigning " ... a!~
other chattels of every name, nature and description
... " the transferor cannot be said to have transferreu
his entire interest. The use of the word "chattels" can
hardly be deemed to embrace the trade name or go<l11
will.
Appellant relies on cases where the language 01
the assignment purported to convey "all property"

6

(Dr. s. A. Richmownd N ~~·vine Co. v. Richm~nd, 159
FS. 293, 296 ( 189.:>), or all property and effects ...
ifieaeman & Co. v. Hegeman, 8 Daley 1 (N. Y. Com\
b
"
mon pleas, 1880) ) , or
... property, and effects of
ererY kin<l ... " ( llai)k of Tomah v. 'Varren, 94 'Vis.
15 1,.68 ~.,V. 549 (1896) ). These decisions are clearly

distinguishable.
~ ot

only was the language of assignment in the
above cases mueh broader than " ... all other chattels
. ,. but two further elements were met: First, in
every ease allowing such a transfer, the court found
ri necessary element of non-deception; and, secondly,
the business itself, as a going concern, must have been
the subject-matter of the transfer in order to include
the trade name, or trade mark.
'

~

POINT II. SINCE THE TRADE N Al\IE
WAS PERSON AL ITS USE MAY BE ENJOINED EYEX IF THE GENERAL ASSIGN)IENT PCRPORTED TO OPERATE AS A
TR.Al~"S:FER.

The trade name has value, under the facts at bar,
only (1) by respondent's future use thereof, or (2)
by appellants' actual piracy and use to their own benefit.
Under different facts, a trade mark or trade name
may haw market value standing alone and could be
sold singularly to a high bidder or a creditor. Such was
the case in Let·enthal v. Ollie Morris Equip. Co., 184
Cal. App. 2d 553, 7 Cal. Rept'r 911 ( 1960), and in sim7

ilar cases where a sale has been recognized th t
"
e rad,
name or mark was of a non personal" nature.
In Falk v. American West Indies Tradinc 1·,
,/ LJ
180 N.Y. 445, 73 N.E. 239 (1905), the user of am,
ar1,
in connection with the manufacture of cigars purporteil
to assign the mark to another upon going out of bu,
ness. The assignee of the mark used it as it had beei
used before without making any indication that he had
succeeded the original user. Subsequently a third partr
began using a similar mark. The assignee sought pr~
tection in equity, but he was denied relief because the
transfer was found ineffective. The court pertinentlr
states:
1

"There is no allegation, proof, or finding u1
this case that the plaintiffs, upon the executioli
of the writing referred to or at any other time,
succeeded in any way to the business of the as·
signor or any part of it, or to the good will to
which up to that time the trade mark had been
attached. It was, as already suggested, simpl~
a written transfer of the naked trade mark ana
labels detached from the business in which it
had been theretofore used, and when used by the
plaintiffs no longer denoted or distinguished the
article or business to which it had been attachea.
We do not say that the principle above suggesteo
would apply to an assignment of all trade mark\
made in a similar way. There are doubtle~s, so~e
trade marks that consist of words that 1dent1fy
an article produced by some secret process ana
without the use of which the article could no:
be described. In other words, the name used ma;
be inherent in the article itself and is not use

8

·is in this case to distinguish one cigar from an~ther. The celebrated cordial, which is in use
the world over, known as 'Chartreuse' is a sample
of a trade mark, the bare assignment of which
might confer upon the assignee the right to manqfadure and sell that article. Other examples
might be cited that would_ not come within the
rule above suggested, but m the case at bar the
tradt mark was originally adopted by the Lichtensteins to distinguish a cigar manufactured
by themsefres. The trade mark in their hands
r~presented the_ir own article, their own skill a~1d
business experience. \Vhen used by the plamtiffs in their business it does not truly denote
anything of the kind and the plaintiffs' claim
really is that they liave acquired the right to
sell their own goods as the goods of someone
else" (73 N.E. 239, at 451).
If respondent, in the instant case, expressly had
made reference to his trade name in the assignment
and if the appellants had held themselves out to the
consuming public as having become the successor of
the original user of the trade name, then the facts might
support appellants' view. Such is not the case, even
assuming that the trade name were non-personal and,
hence, assignable.
'Vhere the trade name connotes a reference to the
goods, and the quality of the goods do not depend on
the skill or trust of the person preparing or selling the
same, then free and separate transferability is generally
recognized. This is because there is no consequent public
deception. On the other hand, if the truthful connotation disappears after the purported transfer, the

9

transferee invariably will. be enjoined from its futu:
use, and, the transfer will be found ineffective. T
truthful connotation disappears entirely in cases wh:;
the trade name has been deemed "personal."

A personal element may exist in good will of ai.

kind, and this element does not pass to a purch.h
or assignee of the business. The Alabama court I.
discussing the sale of a cafe, said that the person,
presence, reputation, management and manner of tu•
seller may have contributed to the creation of the gooi;
will attached to the cafe. The court cogently remarkea:
"Now, on a sale, in the nature of things, this personal
element is withdrawn. The purchaser takes the resulh
of past endeavors in building a business, which he j,
entitled to take as it is, but unaided by the continuini
services of the seller. The personal experience, skill
and reputation of the seller remains his, and canno!
pass as a part of the good will of the business.'' Col/~1
v. Brown, 211 Ala. 443, 100 So. 769, 770 (1924). In
this case the instrument of conveyance recites " ...
all leases, goods, wares, merchandise, good will ana
paraphenalia therewith connected," of the American
Cafe.
The rule is likewise well stated in I Nims, L'nfair
Competition and Trade Marks, 4th Ed., p. 96:
"The good will attached to certain trades or
professions of certain types is not transferrable
as where it depends entirely upon the p~rsonal
reputation art skill and experience of its ere·
'
'
a tor and owner,
and is connected and assoc1a. ted

10

with him alone and with his name. Such good
will cannot be assigned and does not survive
tile owner. * * * This rule applies not only to
the personal, family name of the owner of ~he
<Tood ,rill, but also to a trade name under wl11ch
he practiced his profession. . . . "
ln Bufl'olo 0,l}:ster Co. v. Nenno, 132, .Misc. 213,
~~fl X.Y. Supp. :ZIO ( 1U:28), ~Ir. Nenno entered into
the fishing business and continued in the trade for
many years. For financial reasons he was forced to
mah a general assignment of his assets. The stock in
trade was sold to the lluff alo Oyster Co., Inc. Shortly
after Buffalo ·s purchase of the stock the assignee for
benefit of creditors executed a second written instrument describing "the good will of Nenno and Co., Inc."
and it was delivered to the plaintiff (not unlike the instant case). The court, in determining the right of Buffalo Oyster Co. to enjoin the use of the trade name, squarely based its decision on the rights obtained by the plaintiff by Yirtue of the conveyance from the assignee. The
court reasoned that where N enno's transfer was involuntary, he is free to ·'again establish himself in a similar
business to solicit his old customers" (229 N.Y. Supp.
213). Since the selection or handling of seafood involved
an element of skill, experience and reputation upon
which consumers relied, the court concluded that the
assignee of the good will could not use the name. The
court said that, " ... l we] will not permit a name or
good will to be used to mislead the public as to whom
they are dealing with, when it would be to their injury
to deal with one other than the one with whom they
11

inte~ded t~ deal" (citing 'Vorld's Dispensary .Medit
Assn v. Pierce, 203 N.Y. 419, 96 N.E. 738 (lgl!

The court further observed that the public interest Ii
involved because " ... they have come to rely up on,'
1
skill and experience and his reputation and that the,
factors were known to the public and were a potfc
factor in bringing the business of the public to fr
defendant."
It is not the actual use of a given name which.
essential to assert the protection sought in the instaff
case, but rather the association reasonably made by tni
public between an individual lawfully using the tra~ 1
name and the name itself. In Reconstruction Financi
Corp. v. J. G. Menihan Corp., 22 F. Supp, Ji~
(D.N.Y. 1938), the court observed as follows: "Even
the name of a person can acquire a meaning of Joni
association with the product so that the use of the name
unexplained with another similar product will have tbe
effect of deception .... Descriptive words may acquire
by use a secondary significance which is susceptible
of ownership and entitled to protection in equity" 1:~
F, Supp. 180, 183).
In cases recognizing a transfer, the key guideline
is the exact nature of the trade name's purpose, i.e)hat
which make its valuable.
The factor which we must keep in view is that
trade marks and trade names serve various purPose~
The only common factor is that they give rise .~ a
"habit of patronage." Various factors, in turn, givmg

12

· to this "habit of patronage," may include in any
rise
combination, (a) matter of place, (b) matter of the
erson dealt with, or (c) matter of particular name
~r to goods with a certain mark, without regard to any
other factor, because the goods have been found satisfactory.
An analysis of the cases on this point clearly shows
that the question of transferability turns on the various
functions of the mark or name. The key to the problem
then turns on the consideration "will the consuming
public be deceived?"

In every case analyzed by appellants, where deception was likely, the transfer was prohibited or not
recognized. This key concept was also recognized by
the trial judge below ( Tr. I I 0) .
The test, then, as to whether the truthful connotation disappears after the purported transfer, turns
on an analysis of the facts in each case. Clearly, where
the trade name has been used throughout the years so
that it connotes an identification with a particular
person, or identifies satisfactory past experience by
that person or through his efforts, or through his agents,
then we may deem the trade name "personal." This
is the common thread of the cases analyzed in appellants' brief. See 87 C.J.S., Trade Marks, Trade Names
and Unfair Competition, § I7I, p. 503.
This concept is analagous to "secondary meaning,"
in the law of trade names and unfair competition gene-

13

rally. To be entitled to protection, words in 1
.
.
a .r111,
name which are ~erely generic or geographical mu,
become an embodiment of the owner's reputati' on a1,.
service. In Security Title Irus. Agency ., l'e , ·
"" u cur11
Title Ins. Co., supra, this Court held that the \\Q)ij.
,,
"Security Title" had a "secondary meaning" and hu
become synonymous with the originator and princ,~ 1
stockholder as if his given name had appeared in r!i
name of the business (387 P.2d at 693).
The respect to which the concepts of "persona,
trade names'' and ''secondary meaning'' differ is largeli
factual in application. The ideas upon which thes:
concepts rest, i.e. ( 1) to prevent fraud and deceptio~
to the public, and ( 2) to protect the true owner a,
being the beneficiary of his life efforts, produce tilt
same result.
In the Security Title case, supra, the emphasis I,
fund in prevention of an outsider's use, or "pirating
of the name. In our case, the question is also whether
or not the name could be transferred, even if the !rut
beneficiary desired to do so. Whether or not it coufo
be so transferred is dependent, as we have seen, on tl1t
resulting deception to the consumers in the area. Tllb
question was decided below in respondent's favor, up0n
clear evidence fully justifying the conclusion reacheii
by the court.
That the respondent, either personally or thro~gi:
his agents, contributed a large amount of personahzeu
service and advice cannot be disputed; the appe!lanli
14

nwn statement of facts would so indicate (See appellants' brief at 2, 3, and 4). Indeed, this may point to

,o. me of the contributing factor of respondent's busi-

ness losses. The smaller, more "personalized" sporting
uoods stores apparently did not carry the sales volume
~ecessary to compete with the larger "department
store" sporting goods stores in the Salt Lake City area
(Tr. 52),

Certainly, the reputation and good will which a
trade name symbolizes may mean more than merely
the name brands of goods available at any particular
place. If the product of respondent's life efforts, through
advising his customers, "which length ski," or"what
kind of shotgun," or that "they have been catching fish
ou this lure rather than that lure," has value at all, such
value is bound up on the connotation "Al's Sporting
Goods."
Appellants cannot argue with the trial court's finding that " ... use by defendants of the trade name
'Al's Sporting Goods' is wrongful and unlawful ... "
(R. 21) , and that " . . . [such use] was, therefore,
wrongful and misled the public and plaintiff's customers . . . " ( R. 21 ) .
The foregoing conclusions are not illagical, as
appellant contends, but are express findings that lead
to the ultimate decision of the case. That is, the trade
name "Al's Sporting Goods" has substantial value in
the market place to either the respondent, or to anyone
else. Bnt, its Yalue in the hands of any person other

15

than respondent depends solely on having pot ,
ent11
customers confuse the other person's business wit! tJ·,
l I"
of the respondent's. The conclusion follows that 1,
spondent is the only person in the Salt Lake Cit; art
entitled to be protected in the use of the trade. nani
"Al's Sporting Goods."
In a New York case, In re Adams, 24 Mise L1J:,
53 N.Y. Supp. 666 (1898), the court, dealing 11 1
almost identical facts, enjoined the assignee for i1:
benefit of creditors from selling an alleged trade mar,,
with the other assets, stating: "If his name is of ralut
as a trade mark, it was made so by the skill and energ!
with which he associated the name in his conduct of tlit
business prior to the assignment. If it shall now forever
be transferred to a stranger to be used, by an involWJ·
tary transfer so far as Robert Adams is concerned.
and alone by force of an assignment of the name D)
the general assignee, whose duty ends with the con·
version of the property of the assignor into money for
the payment of debts, then we have the case of a stranger
using a name not associated with his own business soH
by force of the assignment, while the assignor himseli
is debarred forever from using his own name in hi
future efforts to retirieve his fortunes .... "
j

1

POINT III. A TRADE N Al\IE OR TRADE
l\iIARK IS IN SEP ARABLE FROM THE GOOD
WILL OF A BUSINESS, AND CANNOT BE
TRANSFERRED EXCEPT WITH THE BPS!·
NESS ITSELF.

16

The facts of the instant case show a purchase by
of stock in trade, inventory and fixtures
:ippe11an ts
.
.
. the assignee for benefit of creditors. Other assets,
tram
.
. l d'ng a yehicle and accounts receivable, were not
inc u 1 '
.trans f ei·red· There is no eYidence whatever that would
that the business, as a going
supp ort the proposition
.
con C-ei·ri, was transferred or sold to appellants. Of
course, no mention was made either in the offer of
purchase or the conveyance of sale to the trade name
:1r good will of respondent's business (Tr. 138, Ex. P.
20)'

With respect to the severability of the trade name
(good will) from the business itself, I Nims, Unfair
Competition & Trade Marks, Supra, § 17 at 85, observes: "Good will may not be sold or transferred
separate from the business with which it is associated;
and a trade mark or trade name cannot be transferred
separate from the good will which it represents. Therefore, a trade mark or name may not be transferred
except with the business of which it is the outward
sign." See also JfocMahan Formacle Co. v. Denver
Chemical Mfg. Co., 113 Fed. 468, 474 (8th Cir., 1901).
In Ward Chandler Bldg. Co. v. CaUlwell, 8 Cal.
App. 2d 375, 47 P.2d 758 ( 1935), the Hudgen's did
business as "Hudgen's Permanent '1Vave Shop" and
thereafter sold the business, including the trade mark,
to the defendant l\:1ildred Caldwell. Later, plaintiff
secured a judgment against Caldwell for rent and had
a receiver appointed to take the interest of the defend-
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ant and the good will and trade mark of the "F d
lU ge1
Permanent 'V ave Shop" and to sell the same. T
phinciple issue was whether or not the trade name ,~l
trade mark could be sold or assigned except in tll'
nection with the sale of the business. The court ob·\tflt.·
that under the circumstances of the case a proper
right attached to the name which the law would rer·n,
nize and protect and that it cannot exist separately fr,,'
the business to which it belongs and with which 1[
identified, it not being a species of property and carn1,,
be sold and transferred as such. The Court obsmt:
that the trade mark in issue was personal and from,,
inception that it " . . . indicated to the public tti,
the personal care and skill of the Hudgen's were em
cised in producing the goods and rendering the smicr
sold."
The California court further reasons that," . .. u
the bare right of user could be transferred, the naJ!t
or mark would no longer serve to point out and protec
the business with which it has become identified, or !
secure the public against deception, but would ten:
to give a different business the benefit of the reputatiot
established by the business to which the name had prt
viously been applied" ( 47 P.2d at 760). The cou:
recognized that, " ... the general rule is that a persorni
trade mark or trade name is not assignable." The coun
then stated that there is but one exception to the r~t
They said, "an exception to the general rule has beei
made where the mark or name has been so employ~i
as to be deprived of its personal nature and has com
11
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. te that goods bearing it are of a certain stand-

to mdica
.
.
d kind or quality or are made m a certam manner
ar ,
l ,,
or

IJ~,

r!.

fl',.

'ii!

~I]

JL

't·

n

after a certain formu a.

This essentially is the same line of reasoning adopted
bv the New York court in Falk v. American West
l;idies Tradiny Co., supra, and is the basic underpinning for the California decision allowing a ~rade
mark's existence separate and apart from the busmess.
See Leventhal v. Ollie Morris Equip. Co., supra.

Competition & Trade Marks, supra,
) 18. at 96, speaks of breaking the continuity of business
reputations upon which customers are likely to reply.
"The common law has long forbidden naked assignment
or other transfers or trade symbols independently of
the good will which they represent, because such transactions are likely to break the continuity of reputation
and thus, deception of those who have come to rely on
such trade marks and symbols and a good will which
they represent."
I Nims, Unfair

In Holley Milling Co. v. Salt Lake & Jor<lan Mill
& Elevator Co., 58 Utah 149, 197 Pac. 731 ( 1921),
the plaintiff sought an injunction, asserting the wrongful use of his trade mark. The defendant operated two
milling plants, one in North Salt Lake and the other
in South Jordan. The parties entered into an agreement
whereby the defendant agreed to sell the North Salt
Lake plant to the plaintiff. The conveyance described
the buildings and improvements. The plaintiff, after
the sale, undertook to use the trade name and trade
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mark of the defendant describing its products as"\\' ,
F awn " fl our b ran d . Th e court held the terms of t li1i,
raJl\1,,
did not include the trade mark and to hold sue! . ·
11
produce difficulty which "might lead to di·~ °u:,:,
~a~1ro~.
results." The court observed further that ;f
, t
' a ]''111
mark is expressly transferred it must be done · ,, '
by acquiring the good will of the business in connec;[1,,,
with which the trade mark is used, and of which ii
a part. Where it has been held that the trade mart
passed, the vendee has always acquired the gou<l wi'
of the business purchased, and, as a general rule, tli
vendor has retired from the business."
1

The foregoing cases recognize two separate grounGi
for not giving effect to an assignment or transfer of a
business trade name. That the consuming public is at·
ceived is one factor, and is the subject matter of respond·
ent's Point II, supra. The second, and independentfar·
tor, is the recognition of the true owner's right to prater·'
tion of his life-time effort, or "work product," in thecoll1'
pensatory sense. In Budget System, Inc. v BudrH'
Loan & Finance Plan, supra, the plaintiff successful!r
enjoined the defendant corporation's use of the narm
"Budget." This court said that there is an apparen:
"desire in defendant to appear as plaintiff for Int
purpose of benefiting from the good will and reputatiotr
which plaintiff claimed it had developed over the yeaN
... " ( 12 Utah 2d at 21). The court also recognizeO
the element of public deception where customers ma)
buy "in reliance upon a name, reputation, brand,··,
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urchases what has theretofore pleased him.
buyer P
~f because of a similation as to one . . . of those
fe~tures, he gets something different ... it may truly
be said that he has been defrauded" ( 12 Utah 2d at 21).
a

But, in the Budqet case it was assumed, arguendo,
that there was no fraud. Thus, the basis for affirmance
rests primarily on the principle of protecting plaintiff's
rights rather than benefiting the public by protecting
them from fraud.
Judge Learned Hand in Ernerson Elec. Mfg. Co.
v. Emerson Radio & Phonograph Corp., 105 F.2d 908
(2d. Cir. 1939) spoke of the varied interests involved
in a trade name infringement case, including the interest of the owner in sales of the product by the infringer.
The other interest was described as fallows:
"The other interest is the plaintiff's general
reputation which goes with his name. Buyers
from the putative wrongdoer may also buy from
the plaintiff, and many confuse the two; the
plaintiff will not wish to expose his reputation
to the chances of the wrongdoer's conduct of his
business" (105 F.2d 108, 110).
Judge Hand goes on to reason that the interests, though
contingent, are substantial enough to justify protection.
Obviously, his reasoning depends on the element of
deception, or at least the chance of possible mistakes
by the public. However, by his reasoning, the right of
protection runs to the true owner of the mark or name,
and not to the public in general.
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POINT IV. RESPONDENT CANNOT B'
DEEMED TO HAVE ABANDONED R,
TRADE NA.ME BECAUSE OF FINANCI~li
DIFFICULTIES 'VHICH CAUSED BI;ir 'J,
SUSPEND OPERATIONS.
'Vhether the respondent can be deemed to ]~,
abandoned his trade name would depend upon all,
the evidence relating to the manner in which the hu,
ness operation was suspended, whether he transferrt
the trade name and whether subsequent events make
impossible for him to resume business in his trade nami

1

"Al's Sporting Goods" is an honored name ml~
business signified, and the plaintiff, by his special anii
unusual skill, knowledge and reputation, made thena
a valuable and inseparable part of himself, and it ma!~
no difference that the business has been suspendea k
his insolvency because his trade name " ... is his capifa
for a new beginning." Mattingly v. Stone, 12 Ky,l
Rep. 72, 14 S.W. 47 (1890).
The mere suspension of business operations becau•,
of financial difficulties does not support the contentio:
that respondent abandoned his trade name (see anrn·
tation, 3 A.L.R. 2d, 1226, at 1246, and cases cit~
therein).
In a suit to enjoin trade name infringement ih
the "trade," and the "bare-name," which must~.
totally and irrevocably abandoned in any event. Tl
R.F.C., a government agency, became the ownerol
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ubstantial part of a shoe manufacturing business by
s.nr t ue of· its secured interest when the business defaulted on its loan payments. The R.F.C. paid a
separate consideration to the trustee in bankruptcy
real estate, fixtures, machinery, ... equipment,
"
for .. ·
all trade marks, together with the good will of the
business ... and such right as the bankrupt had to use
the name (s ) . . · · "

R..F.C., not being able to sell the entire business,
as a going concern, began liquidating the assets to
separate purchasers. The bankrupt, some six years
later, began manufacturing shoes under the same trade
names. "Arch-Aid" and ".Menihan." R.F.C., not yet
having sold some of the bankrupt company's assets,
including the trade marks and trade names, brought
suit to enjoin the original owner's use. Held, on the
merits, the complaint should be dismissed. ReconstructionFinance Corp. v. J. G. Menihan Corp., 28 F. Supp.
920 (D.N.Y. 1941), aff'd, 312 U.S. 81 (1941). Thus,
after some six years in time after their financial problems. the original owners were allowed to begin anew,
using the same trade name. The court reasoned that
R.F.C., did not abandon the trade names because it
never acquired them, thus avoiding the question of
separating the ''going concern" from the "trade name"
in gross. The court did, however, recognize the rule
that:
. ".The sole function of a trade mark being to
md1cate the origin or ownership of the goods, it
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cannot exist a part from the business t0
its use is incident."
wn,
The Supreme Court of the United States · B
lll f'1'
Nut Packing Co. v. Lorillard Co., Supra, has held![,
abandonment can only be shown where the 1· 1 ..
neut
of the owner is clear and unequivocal ' but ·i·I
' 1ere
intention to abandon is not clear, no abandonment,
be found. See also E. I. du Pont de Nemoun H
v. Celanese Corp .. 167 F. 2d 484 ( 1948).
1.

The instant case is devoid of evidence of an inte
tion to abandon plaintiff's trade name, and in theabse~,
of some express intention to do so, such an intenn
cannot be inferred.

CONCLUSION
The question presented is whether or not, 1,1ne:
the bare right to use a trade name is allegedly Ira~
ferred, will such a transfer give a different busim·
the benefit of the reputation established by the busli1r
to which it has become a synonym, and in deception
the public?
Such a question is largely a problem of fact11
analysis under the different circumstances of differr:
cases. The trial court below, as the only logical conclv
sion from its findings, determined the question in fa 11 •
of the respondent.
Such a decision, supported by clear evidence,~·
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ce with all reasoned authority. It is also a deci-

acco rdan
sion which respondent respectfully requests this court

to affirm.

Respectfully submitted,

'VILLIAM G. FOWLER
340 East Fourth South

Salt Lake City, Utah
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